German Coalition Defence Policy

The copious coalition agreement in Germany makes grim reading for anyone concerned with defence.  Germany already struggles to maintain defence spending above a pathetic 1.2% of GDP and with a new SPD Finance Minister in charge of the coffers, the chances of Germany fulfilling the NATO commitment of 2% seem very remote indeed.  News of the coalition agreement came as China announced that she was increasing defence spending by a whopping 8.1%!

Carefully avoiding a definition of Germany’s strategic place in the world the agreement on defence and security includes some notable fudges:

• “Earmark any additional government surplus” for defence development and crisis prevention – spending split equally between military and non-military projects.  So, don’t hold your breath whilst they set about making a few more squadrons of Tornado aircraft operational again

• “Take the initiative to strengthen European foreign policy making mechanism,” similar to PESCO structure set up to coordinate EU military projects.  This may, as I have already pointed out, provide a field hospital in a few years’ time but it is not going to do anything positive in the short to medium term to address the declining capability of European armed forces

• “Pursue a goal” of strengthening European contribution to NATO and strengthening cooperation between EU and NATO.  It is difficult to see how setting up any parallel military structure in Europe, defined as “complementary” or not, could possibly strengthen EU contribution to NATO.  Quite the contrary

• At a time when the NATO Secretary General is urging members to increase their defence spending because of a more assertive and aggressive Russia, the coalition agreement “seeks a solution” to the Ukraine conflict and a willingness to loosen sanctions if Russia cooperates

• There is no mention of NATO target of spending 2 percent of GDP on military. Instead, Germany aims to “achieve agreed NATO capability goals and close gaps in capabilities.” This is probably the most worrying deficiency and betrays German commitment to NATO. Early next year, NATO allies will report on their specific defence investment plans, covering three main areas: cash, capabilities, and contributions. In other words, how they will meet their commitment to spend 2 percent of GDP on defence; how they will invest additional funding in key military capabilities; and how they will contribute to NATO missions and operations.  Against the background that 80% of NATO’s defence expenditures will come from non-EU allies and that 3 of the 4 four battle groups we have in the Baltic countries and Poland will be led by non-EU allies (US, UK, and Canada), it should be an interesting discussion at the NATO Summit in July?

We may be about to leave the EU but I don’t think, during future Brexit negotiations, we need take any lessons from our German allies about being good Europeans!