A New Cold War in the Far East?

Secluded, isolated, and impoverished, North Korea has no other leverage instruments of foreign policy other than a nuclear capability.  Karl Marx wrote that the most effective power is structural because it functions without being used. Nuclear weapons, the ultimate expression of strength, function in exactly this way and provide status in international hierarchies. North Korea accepted the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985 but withdrew in 2002 (the only country to have done so).  Since 2002, North Korea has conducted numerous nuclear and missile delivery tests (in defiance of the UN).  We now understand that North Korea is on the brink of deploying a ballistic nuclear missile capability with the range to reach the West Coast of the USA.  Over the weekend, they tested a hydrogen bomb claimed to be small enough to be fitted to the intercontinental missile. This places continental US under direct threat of a first use nuclear attack.  Bellicose threats of respective annihilation have resulted and the US is attempting to gain consensus in the UN Security Council to bring the maverick North Korea to (the US) heel.

What will Kim do with this devastating power? Obviously, an ideologically crazed attack on the US is a possibility. Whilst this would cause unacceptable damage to the US, even if only one warhead got through, the massive American nuclear arsenal would ensure the complete obliteration of North Korea.  The fire and fury, not to mention the radiation, would be incidental – the initial blast having flattened everything of significance. Both sides know this and therefore it is reasonable to assume it won’t happen because of the threat of mutually assured destruction. After all, this kept the nuclear arms confrontation between USSR an NATO at just that, a confrontation, for 50 years so why shouldn’t the same logic work here?

However, whilst another nuclear balance of terror might keep the peace it would not deal with the consequences of proliferation.  At the moment, North Korea exports its rocket and nuclear technology to third countries thus exacerbating proliferation problems. It is in all our interests for this transfer to come under international control. 

The more likely explanation is that North Korea wants to use it’s new found power as a bargaining chip, both in terms of improving international prestige and trade. Paradoxically, Kim may reason that a nuclear armed North Korea may be more likely to escape from UN censure and trade sanctions than if he were to offer to bring his arms programme into existing nuclear treaties.  This may be true and President Trump recognises that Kim can be a “smart cookie,” in which case, Trump should recognise that Kim is unlikely to give up his "trump" card for anything.  An international accommodation with the new reality will be required.  It seems certain, however, that we shall not be able to discover what Kim really wants without talking to him, directly or indirectly so let us hope that channels of bilateral dialogue are set up before misunderstanding breeds.  Although face to face dialogue seems unlikely in the short term, they must talk eventually.

The role of China as interlocutor will be vital.  China buys coal, about the only thing North Korea produces and otherwise bankrolls the North Korean state.  Whilst China could bring North Korea to heel by withdrawing support, such action could result in the breakdown of the North Korean state and provoke the same reaction as military action, albeit with less immediate panic.  There is no win-win course of action for China as she walks a tightrope between the international responsibilities of a global super power and regional imperative to keep stability in its own backyard. Whatever it does, China plays its cards very close to its chest. 

Digressing in search of an example, I was in Hong Kong in 1974 awaiting the arrival of my bride by RAF VC-10. The wedding had been arranged to take place at RAF Kai Tak exactly 7 days later to comply with residency rules. However, I had reckoned without the power of nature and Typhoon Gloria, rapidly approaching Hong Kong from Luzon to the East. Wind speeds rose and soon the normally challenging approaches to the Kai Tak Airport became unsafe.  The RAF wisely decided to hold the VC10 in Singapore until the weather in Hong Kong improved. The delay meant that my future wife could no longer fulfil the residency requirements and so a special licence was required.  Local friends at the Royal Hong Kong Auxiliary Air Force, where I was on Loan Service from the RAF, advised that I should visit the official responsible to obtain a licence as soon as possible so I rushed down to Star Ferry and across to Hong Kong side to the Government office responsible.  There is was greeted by a solitary official seated behind a large desk. It was well known that Hong Kong Chinese were particularly inscrutable. In business, one often described one’s Chinese negotiator as sitting wearing an impenetrable “scrute.”  And so it was with the wedding licence official.  Although I had only been in the Colony for a few months, I had already learned enough about local custom to know that it was always a mistake to rush things.  So, I sat down opposite and impassively observed the scrute, hoping that such an obvious display of interest would break the ice.  It didn’t and I jumped to the third stage of the standard negotiating process, opening my wallet.  I began by removing large red $HK 100 notes, one at a time.  Miraculously, after the third or fourth, the scrute softened and an envelope was passed across the desk.  Nothing else was said and I left immediately, rushing back to Star Ferry just in time to catch the last departure before that service closed for the duration.

I make that personal reminiscence because, in dealing with China, probably not much has changed and, in the interests of peaceful coexistence, President Trump will have to find his own way to get behind the scrute.