Sunday, 29 May 2016
SACEUR Balls
The respective former SACEURs appear to base their hope that the EU will continue to have the United Kingdom as an " active and often decisive voice" on the premise that they have observed "the vital importance of British leadership in EU military operations." I wonder to which EU military operations they might be referring?
Thursday, 19 May 2016
European Offence
Various people have tried, and failed, to create a European
super state through military means. The
historical list includes Adolf Hitler. The EU is also trying to create a European
super state, but through political manoeuvring.
Boris Johnson points out that the EU, like the military dictators before
them, will also fail because there is no fundamental and underlying loyalty to
a “European” identity in the EU. So what
is offensive about that? Surely Boris
bashers could not be imagining that Germany was behind the EU drive towards a
super state?
Wednesday, 18 May 2016
The Queen's Speech and National Defence
When we have digested the Queen’s Speech today, it should be
very easy to agree with General Sir Richard Shirreff that “Britain was now
little different from any other semi-pacifist, European social democracy, more
interested in protecting welfare and benefits than maintaining adequate
defences.” Presumably, the Remainians
have decided that the smoke and mirrors of the UK “commitment” to spend 2% of
GDP on “defence (whatever that comprises)” is sufficient evidence to conclude
that Great Britain will be safer with its equally lily-livered allies in (a
reformed) Europe? Give us strength!
Friday, 22 April 2016
Libya - Here We Go Again
As we seem to move, inexorably, towards a deployment of
British troops in Libya, I hope all our decision makers have read and digested
Christopher Elliott’s excellent book, “High Command” – British Military
Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars.
Any armed conflict must command the commitment of the nation as a whole.
On the other hand, it could be argued that since we are only intending to deploy
a few hundred troops in non-combat training roles, we do not need to apply very
much scrutiny to the plans. Wiser heads
may disagree and, perhaps, envisage a more complex situation developing in
which a whole of Government approach would be required. It would be foolish not to have considered
potential complications or the consequences of escalation. In his
analysis, Major General Elliott helpfully identifies a number of things that
went wrong on the last 2 occasions. For
the Service Chiefs, it goes almost without saying that they should be provided
with adequate resources to do the job and that sufficient contingency reserves
are available. As for politicians, since
it is now commonplace to verify compliance through box-ticking, so much easier
than arguing the specifics, I have distilled General Elliott’s observations
into a handy checklist. Busy
politicians, with an eye on writing their memoirs in the future, may care to
seize the opportunity to satisfy themselves on the basics before acquiescing to
the Prime Minister’s slam-dunk deployment plans? So, here we go:
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The collective political will is
strong enough to withstand the consequences of what might develop
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All decisions have been recorded
with proper underpinning analysis
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UK military command structure is
able to operate effectively in a coalition
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Arrangements for proper coordination
of British and coalition commanders with representatives of other government departments
in theatre are inadequate
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Processes and working practices
in MOD will ensure clarity of purpose
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If CDS becomes the single focus
for the conduct of military operations, proper arrangements are in place to
ensure wider influences who might question assumptions and conclusions are
not side-lined
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The ground truth, what is
really going on, is available to decision makers in London
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I promise I won’t become
distracted by more pressing domestic issues eg getting re-elected, whilst our
soldiers are in harm’s way
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