Sunday, 29 May 2016

SACEUR Balls

The respective former SACEURs appear to base their hope that the EU will continue to have the United Kingdom as an " active and often decisive voice" on the premise that they have observed "the vital importance of British leadership in EU military operations."  I wonder to which EU military operations they might be referring?

Thursday, 19 May 2016

European Offence



Various people have tried, and failed, to create a European super state through military means.  The historical list includes Adolf Hitler. The EU is also trying to create a European super state, but through political manoeuvring.  Boris Johnson points out that the EU, like the military dictators before them, will also fail because there is no fundamental and underlying loyalty to a “European” identity in the EU.  So what is offensive about that?  Surely Boris bashers could not be imagining that Germany was behind the EU drive towards a super state?



Wednesday, 18 May 2016

The Queen's Speech and National Defence



When we have digested the Queen’s Speech today, it should be very easy to agree with General Sir Richard Shirreff that “Britain was now little different from any other semi-pacifist, European social democracy, more interested in protecting welfare and benefits than maintaining adequate defences.”  Presumably, the Remainians have decided that the smoke and mirrors of the UK “commitment” to spend 2% of GDP on “defence (whatever that comprises)” is sufficient evidence to conclude that Great Britain will be safer with its equally lily-livered allies in (a reformed) Europe?  Give us strength!

Friday, 22 April 2016

Libya - Here We Go Again




As we seem to move, inexorably, towards a deployment of British troops in Libya, I hope all our decision makers have read and digested Christopher Elliott’s excellent book, “High Command” – British Military Leadership in the Iraq and Afghanistan Wars.  Any armed conflict must command the commitment of the nation as a whole. On the other hand, it could be argued that since we are only intending to deploy a few hundred troops in non-combat training roles, we do not need to apply very much scrutiny to the plans.  Wiser heads may disagree and, perhaps, envisage a more complex situation developing in which a whole of Government approach would be required.  It would be foolish not to have considered potential complications or the consequences of escalation.  In his analysis, Major General Elliott helpfully identifies a number of things that went wrong on the last 2 occasions.  For the Service Chiefs, it goes almost without saying that they should be provided with adequate resources to do the job and that sufficient contingency reserves are available.  As for politicians, since it is now commonplace to verify compliance through box-ticking, so much easier than arguing the specifics, I have distilled General Elliott’s observations into a handy checklist.  Busy politicians, with an eye on writing their memoirs in the future, may care to seize the opportunity to satisfy themselves on the basics before acquiescing to the Prime Minister’s slam-dunk deployment plans?  So, here we go:

The collective political will is strong enough to withstand the consequences of what might develop

All decisions have been recorded with proper underpinning analysis

UK military command structure is able to operate effectively in a coalition

Arrangements for proper coordination of British and coalition commanders with representatives of other government departments in theatre are inadequate

Processes and working practices in MOD will ensure clarity of purpose

If CDS becomes the single focus for the conduct of military operations, proper arrangements are in place to ensure wider influences who might question assumptions and conclusions are not side-lined

The ground truth, what is really going on, is available to decision makers in London

I promise I won’t become distracted by more pressing domestic issues eg getting re-elected, whilst our soldiers are in harm’s way