Thursday 27 April 2017

Ashley Yet To Congratulate Benitez

According to The Times today, "Ashley yet to congratulate Benitez on promotion glory." I declare an interest but I wonder, having fulfilled his contractual obligation and pocketed a, reported, £4m bonus, what else Benitez might expect from the owner?

Wednesday 19 April 2017

Labour Shortage Post Brexit

A lot has been made of the dire consequences for the soft fruit and vegetable trade and hospitality industries should EU freedom of movement be restricted post Brexit.

This is part of the letter I wrote to The Times yesterday (they didn't publish):



"Your Leader, 18 April, conveniently blames the depreciation in the value of Sterling on the Brexit vote.  As I understand it, the latest inflation figure was 2.3%, the same pace as in the previous month and in line with market expectations ie close enough to the Bank of England target of 2%.  If households really are noticing rising food prices and seen their real incomes harmed, is it not fairer to say that these results are the effect of inflation and the overdue devaluation of Sterling and not, necessarily, the Brexit vote?  To paraphrase your conclusion,  it is past the time that your Newspaper provided the candour that has so far been lacking in this debate.

As for the crisis in the labour market which you forecast to occur once Britain exits the EU and “ends freedom of movement,” perhaps we should be looking to robots to carry out mundane and unskilled tasks?  I for one should be very pleased to have my coffee made and served by a smart, clean and articulate robot that will not be concerned or offended when I tell it what to do with the offer to join the loyalty club."

Sunday 16 April 2017

North Korea



Secluded, isolated and impoverished, North Korea has no other leverage instruments of foreign policy other than a nuclear capability.  Karl Marx wrote that the most effective power is structural because it functions without being used. Nuclear weapons, the ultimate expression of strength, function in exactly this way and provide status in international heirarchies. North Korea accepted the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1985 but withdrew in 2002 (the only country to have done so).  Since 2002, North Korea has conducted numerous nuclear and missile delivery tests (in defiance of the UN).  We now understand that North Korea is on the brink of deploying a ballistic nuclear missile capability with the range to reach the West Coast of the USA.

The US National Security Strategy states that the US must deter and defend against the threat of weapons of mass destruction before they are unleashed.  They will not wait until l they are attacked before acting. President Bush called this a strategy of pre-emption.  However, there is a distinction in international law.  Pre-emption, that is, taking military action to stop an imminent attack is legal under international law.  However, prevention, that is acting against a potential opponent who may or may not have the intention of attacking in the future, is not.

With no evidence that the USA is under the threat of imminent attack, President Trump is taking a position from which preventive action could be possible.

Noises from the White House and the Pentagon seem confident that the US has the capability to eliminate key nuclear and missile capabilities in a series of surgical strikes.  Whilst this would deal with the missile threat for today, unfortunately, it would not neutralise the North Korean regime.  The reaction by a regime stung by the ultimate humiliation of having their offensive nuclear power neutralised is a very big cause for concern for us all.

There is a strong possibility of North Korea taking retaliatory action.  We know that the North has thousands of artillery pieces ranged along the DMZ with South Korea.  Unleashed, this artillery barrage would cause catastrophic damage to the civilian population in Seoul, only 35 miles away.  North Korea could also strike at US bases in Japan, for example, the enormous facility at Kadena would be within range of medium-range missile attack.  The risks of regional escalation would be significant but, of course, would be balanced by the perception of the threat to the US itself.
US military capability, over time, could probably significantly degrade North Korean retaliatory capability.  For example, huge blast bombs, recently demonstrated, and carpet bombing by B-52 aircraft could lay waste to North Korean artillery and retaliatory capability but they would be unlikely to stop it in its tracks.  The US use of tactical nuclear weapons would certainly be considered.
The other factor that must be considered is what happens to North Korea in the meantime.  If the state breaks down millions of starving refuges would flood in both directions, South Korea, and China.  Neither influx would be welcome nor manageable.  China may see the collapse of the North Korean buffer as a threat to its own security.

All of which makes preventive action by the USA a very risky and costly option.
On the other hand, North Korea’s neighbour and sometime ideological partner, effectively underpins North Korean existence.  China buys coal, about the only thing North Korea produces and otherwise bankrolls the North Korean state.  Whilst China could bring North Korea to heel by withdrawing support, such action could result in the breakdown of the North Korean state and provoke the same reaction as military action, albeit with less immediate panic.  There is no win-win course of action for China but it is to be hoped that they will feel the offer of President Trump’s “grand bargain,” – long-term trading partnerships and deals in return for Chinese cooperation in dealing with North Korea is the sensible way forward.

Let us hope so because the build-up of US force looks very much like an option of preventive action.  And bear in mind, for all the regional risks, the only thing that matters to the USA is their own security and you may agree with me that they are likely to act accordingly?