How to Write-Off an Entire Air Force - 3

On 4 May 1975, the three sections of the formation took off independently and made their way to the rendezvous in the airspace known as “Brothers.”  Red Section was the last to arrive and I saw the Wessex of 28 Squadron neatly arranged in the lead followed by the Sioux of 656 AAC (they had fielded their full complement today) in some sort of ragged same-way-same-day formation.  The idea was that the entire formation would come together then the leader would commence a timing racetrack pattern which would lead to a straight run-in for the flypast over the harbour between Kowloon and Hong Kong at exactly the correct time.  However, observing the antics of the Sioux, I decided that I would not put Red Section into the formation flypast position immediately because holding us there, whilst all the timing manoeuvring was going on, would entail too much hard work for my section, particularly as the section ahead seemed to be taking their time in sorting themselves out into decent order.  So, I shadowed the two front sections, sitting slightly high and wide to the right so that, as the final turn for the run in commenced, I would be nicely placed to either cut or extend the corner and slot Red Section into flypast position without exaggerated speed changes.  This tactic worked perfectly and we rolled out on the final run-in in the exact position behind the Army and off we went until ground control suddenly announced, “EAGLE FORAMTION, HOLD AT GREEN ISLAND.”

Presumably, the Royal Barge had been delayed and, hence, the timing of the flypast must be adjusted.  The Wessex in the lead, therefore, commenced a left-hand timing racetrack at Green Island awaiting clearance for the run-in.  Once again, I craftily slipped to the side and climbed a few feet to give myself the flexibility to slot in on the roll out.  And once again, this worked perfectly.  What I did not know, nor could not have known, was that Sioux formation had slipped behind the Wessex in the turn and used all the speed they had available to catch up as the run-in commenced.  I maintained my position behind the Sioux until suddenly the tail end Sioux reared up in front in a frantic attempt to slow down – they had grossly over-cooked their catch-up.  The quick stop technique is highly effective in helicopters and is used to decelerate in normal flight the hover.  I think way it would be done would be to pitch up the nose with backward cyclic and then prevent the subsequent climb by lowering the collective.  All pretty normal for a helicopter but a very alarming manoeuvre if you are sat behind in a fixed wind aircraft with very different aerodynamics!  

I reacted by reducing my speed, as rapidly as I dared, but in the next millisecond the sky was filled with whiling rotor blades and stark terror as Red Section merged with the Sioux ahead.  Nobody said anything.  Fortunately, we were stacked up on the Sioux so, although we almost overtook the formation in front, the small height separation ensured our survival but by this time our two Alouettes and the Musketeer were making their own arrangements.  Presentationally, since the incident occurred just as we were overhead the Royal barge, it must have looked very tight and impressive from the surface.

A few seconds later, with the rest of the formation now in full sight again, we continued as if nothing had happened until the respective sections split and recovered to respective bases.  We signed in operations and made tea.

Still nobody said anything and I was sitting in my office at the RHKAAF HQ when the telephone rang.  It was a Major from Sek Kong (the airfield in the New Territories close to the Chinese Border where the Army were based). The very polite Major understood there had been a little difficulty for us on the run in and he apologised if they had caused us any problems.  I made no comment, thanked him for his call, and rang off.

It was only later, in the Flying Club which we used as an informal Officers’ Mess, and over several glasses of San Miguel, that we began to piece together what had happened.  I’ll leave you, the reader, to point the finger but what I did learn was the wisdom of that order that restricted powers of authorisation for mixed formations.  Mixed formations are inherently risky than homogenous formations because not everybody in the formation is, necessarily, fully familiar with the aerodynamic characteristics and limitations of the other aircraft.  I had nearly found this out the hard way.  Fortunately, I lived to tell the tale but it has taken 42 years for me to get round to telling it.  Some things are better obscured by time.  Indeed, my recollection in the narrative may have missed some detail or nuance.  However, the picture of the Sioux violently slowing down in front of me is still fresh today and I certainly don’t need this photograph to remind me!